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Justice Gina M. Benavides & Joshua J. Caldwell 
The Texas Standards for Appellate Conduct: 
An Annotated Guide and Commentary 
Abstract.  The legal profession is bound by ethical rules that govern and 
guide our conduct and actions as lawyers.  One of the under-appreciated, but 
profoundly important set of guidelines is the Texas Standards for Appellate 
Conduct.  These Standards serve as an excellent practice guide for appellate 
practitioners and appellate courts and as a model code of conduct for the Bar 
as a whole. 
The goal of this Article is to dissect the Texas Standards for Appellate 
Conduct and provide useful commentaries for the readers to better appreciate 
and understand each element of the Standards.  The commentaries provide 
direct case examples and anecdotal guidance for the audience’s benefit.  Lastly, 
the Authors hope that this Article serves as a teaching tool, refresher course, or 
general reminder of how important ethics are in the legal profession and how 
all parties involved in it can benefit by subscribing to these Standards. 
Authors.  Justice Gina M. Benavides is a sitting elected Justice on the 
Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi and Edinburg.  She was elected 
in 2006 and subsequently re-elected in 2012.  Joshua J. Caldwell formerly served 
as Justice Benavides’s senior staff attorney, is board certified in civil appellate 
law by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization, and is currently in private 
practice in San Antonio.  The Authors would like to specifically thank and 
recognize Thirteenth Court of Appeals’ staff attorneys Nick Dominguez, Cindy 
Polinard, and Andrew Thompson, who each contributed to a shorter and 
slightly different version of this Article.  Lastly, the Authors would like to thank 
attorneys Ashly Reeve and Augie Rivera for their invaluable feedback during 
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I.    INTRODUCTION 
This Article began as a Continuing Legal Education presentation to local 
bar associations and has since evolved into its current form.  It discusses the 
Texas Standards for Appellate Conduct (the “Standards”) and provides 
annotated editorial commentary that will include observations from the 
field, as well as examples of how the Standards have been followed—and 
not followed—in appellate practice. 
As a starting point, the adoption of the Appellate Standards of Conduct 
in the late 1990s was the brainchild of the Appellate Section of the State Bar 
of Texas, which sought to develop ethical guidelines for appellate 
practitioners.1  Texas was the first jurisdiction in the United States to adopt 
such standards.2  As professional standards of conduct began developing in 
other jurisdictions throughout the country for the trial bar, appellate lawyers 
in Texas thought that the appellate bar “fell somewhat short of being all that 
 
1. See Kevin Debose, Standards for Appellate Conduct Adopted in Texas, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 
191, 194 (2000) (noting the Appellate Section of the Texas State Bar appointed a committee to 
“complete[] a draft of the Standards for Appellate Conduct”). 
2. See id. at 191 (“The adoption of the Standards made Texas the first jurisdiction in the United 
States to adopt guidelines specifically directed to attorneys practicing in the appellate courts.”); see also 
Catherine Stone, Appellate Standards of Conduct as Adopted in Texas, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1097, 1097–98 
(2006) (“Texas was the first state in the country to promulgate professional standards specifically for 
appellate practitioners.”). 
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it could be in this department.”3  In response, the Appellate Section of the 
State Bar of Texas appointed a committee made up of a current appellate 
justice, a former appellate justice, a current court staff attorney, a former 
appellate court staff attorney, full-time appellate lawyers, and lawyers who 
do both trial and appellate work.4 
After a year of studying creeds and standards of conduct for trial lawyers 
from nearly forty jurisdictions, the committee drafted the Standards.5  The 
draft was circulated to the Appellate Section and the State Bar Board of 
Directors.6  The Board of Directors then appointed an ad hoc committee 
that studied the Standards and sought feedback by forwarding a copy of the 
proposed Standards to every state and federal trial and appellate judge in 
Texas, every former chief justice of the Texas Courts of Appeals, the chair 
of every state bar section, and other key stakeholders.7  The revised 
Standards were eventually approved by the State Bar Board of Directors in 
1997 and forwarded to the Supreme Court of Texas and the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals for review and approval.8  Once adopted, the Standards 
were printed in the April 1999 Texas Bar Journal.9  Some appellate courts, 
such as the First and Fifth Courts of Appeals, have specifically adopted the 
Standards into each Court’s practitioners’ guide to their respective courts.10  
All the other courts provide links to the Standards on their website for 
counsel’s reference.11 
The Standards are divided into five sections: (1) the Preamble; 
(2) Lawyers’ Duties to Clients; (3) Lawyers’ Duties to the Court; 
 
3. Debose, supra note 1, at 193. 
4. Id. at 194. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 194–95. 
7. Id. at 195. 
8. Id. at 194. 
9. Id.  
10. See Order of the Court of Appeals for the First District of Texas, Misc. No. 99-9012 
(Dec. 18, 2002), http://www.txcourts.gov/media/183737/conduct_order.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
7RR3-K3LD] (adopting the Standards “by Order of the Supreme Court of Texas and the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals under Misc. Docket No. 99-9012 on February 1, 1999”); Fifth Court of Appeals, 
Standards for Appellate Conduct, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.txcourts.gov/5thcoa/practice-before-
the-court/appellate-conduct/ [https://perma.cc/F7XP-43AY] (relaying the February 1, 1999 order by 
the Texas Supreme Court and Court of Criminal Appeals pertaining to the Standards). 
11. See Second Court of Appeals, Practice Before the Court, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, 
http://www.txcourts.gov/2ndcoa/practice-before-the-court/ [https://perma.cc/QGU4-26QF] 
(linking the Standards for Appellate Conduct to its webpage); see also Seventh Court of Appeals, Practice 
Before the Court, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.txcourts.gov/7thcoa/practice-before-the-court/ 
[https://perma.cc/6ZFV-W2VV] (linking general standards of conduct to its webpage). 
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(4) Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers; and (5) the Court’s Relationship with 
Counsel.12  This Article will analyze and annotate each section. 
II.    PREAMBLE 
This Article has divided the Standards’ Preamble into three paragraphs: 
Lawyers are an indispensable part of the pursuit of justice.  They are officers 
of courts charged with safeguarding, interpreting, and applying the law 
through which justice is achieved.  Appellate courts rely on counsel to present 
opposing views of how the law should be applied to facts established in other 
proceedings.  The appellate lawyer’s role is to present the law controlling the 
disposition of a case in a manner that clearly reveals the legal issues raised by 
the record while persuading the court that an interpretation or application 
favored by the lawyer’s clients is in the best interest of the administration of 
equal justice under law.13 
Commentary: The opening paragraph of the Preamble recognizes the 
vital role that lawyers play in the big picture of our justice system and, more 
specifically, in the appellate arena.  As a reminder, lawyers serve a noble part 
in helping appellate courts navigate the oftentimes rough waters of a case 
on appeal.  Many cases are complex, dense, and unsettled, and appellate 
courts rely heavily on appellate counsel to assist in understanding the critical 
issue in a case.14 
The duties lawyers owe to the justice system, other officers of the court, and 
lawyers’ clients are generally well-defined and understood by the appellate bar.  
Problems that arise when duties conflict can be resolved through 
understanding the nature and extent of a lawyer’s respective duties, avoiding 
the tendency to emphasize a particular duty at the expense of others, and 
 
12. See generally TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, reprinted in TEX. R. APP. P. (West 2016) 
(listing the Standards and dividing them into five parts, including the preamble). 
13. Id. pmbl. ¶ 1. 
14. See Maixner v. Maixner, 641 S.W.2d 374, 376 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1982, no writ) 
(“Consequently, he is in a much better position than an appellate court, who must rely on the written 
record alone, to assess the needs of the child and to adjudge from personal observation which 
arrangement will serve the best interest of the child.” (citing Little v. Little, 590 S.W.2d 620, 624 
(Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth 1972, no writ))); see also Brad M. Wilson, Appeal Dismissed! Avoiding 
Premature Dismissal in the Court of Appeals: Appeals Are Often Dismissed Prematurely Because Attorneys Make 
Three Common-but Easily-Avoided-Errors, 61 J. MO. B. 318, 322 (2005) (“Appellate courts rely on the 
record to make decisions, and it is the attorney’s job to supply a complete record of the proceedings 
below.” (footnote omitted)). 
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detached common sense.  To that end, the following standards of conduct for 
appellate lawyers are set forth by reference to the duties owed by every 
appellate practitioner.15 
Commentary: The second paragraph of the Preamble recognizes that 
the legal profession has a set of duties that are already understood and 
followed by the appellate bar.16  In this Article, certain standards are 
cross-referenced along with pre-existing duties that apply to all lawyers 
under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as 
professional obligations spelled out in the Texas Lawyer’s Creed. 
Use of these standards for appellate conduct as a basis for motions for 
sanctions, civil liability or litigation would be contrary to their intended 
purpose and shall not be permitted.  Nothing in these standards alters existing 
standards of conduct under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct, the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure or the Code of Judicial 
Conduct.17 
Commentary: The third paragraph of the Preamble appears to neutralize 
the Standards by emphasizing that the Standards shall not be used as the 
basis for any liability against a practitioner who fails to follow them.  
Nevertheless, in a profession in which credibility, candor, and honesty are 
valued attributes, lawyers should be mindful of the reputational and 
professional damage that can occur from disregarding rules prescribing 
ethical conduct. 
III.    LAWYERS’ DUTIES TO CLIENTS 
A lawyer owes to a client allegiance, learning, skill, and industry.  A lawyer 
shall employ all appropriate means to protect and advance the client’s 
legitimate rights, claims, and objectives.  A lawyer shall not be deterred by a 
real or imagined fear of judicial disfavor or public unpopularity, nor be 
influenced by mere self-interest.  The lawyer’s duty to a client does not militate 
against the concurrent obligation to treat with consideration all persons 
 
15. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 2. 
16. Texas Ethics Resources, ST. B. TEX., https://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm? 
Section=Ethics_Resources [https://perma.cc/MA4W-7J4A] (choosing not to differentiate between 
the types of Texas attorneys when stating that all Texas attorneys are bound by the Texas Disciplinary 
Rules of Professional Conduct and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure). 
17. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 3. 
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involved in the legal process and to avoid the infliction of harm on the 
appellate process, the courts, and the law itself. 
Standard 1: Counsel will advise their clients of the contents of these 
Standards of Conduct when undertaking representation.18 
Commentary: This standard sets forth a good rule of thumb for 
appellate practitioners: provide full disclosure to your client regarding all 
boundaries of a lawyer’s representation, even on appeal.  This standard 
coincides with Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.02(f), which mandates that a lawyer 
consult with his or her client regarding the ethical and legal bounds of a 
lawyer’s particular representation.19 
Standard 2: Counsel will explain the fee agreement and cost expectation to 
their clients.  Counsel will then endeavor to achieve the client’s lawful 
appellate objectives as quickly, efficiently, and economically as possible.20 
Commentary: This standard coincides with existing duties owed by 
lawyers to clients under Texas Disciplinary Rule 1.04 with regard to fees.21 
Standard 3: Counsel will maintain sympathetic detachment, recognizing that 
lawyers should not become so closely associated with clients that the lawyer’s 
objective judgment is impaired.22 
Commentary: Generally, appellate lawyers should not allow emotions 
regarding a client’s case cloud his or her judgment and advocacy on 
appeal.23  However, effective lawyering sometimes requires empathy to 
 
18. Id. ¶ 1, Standard 1. 
19. Compare id. (requiring counsel to fully brief their clients on the appellate standards of 
conduct), with TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.02(f), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2016) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (“When a lawyer knows that 
a client expects representation not permitted by the rules of professional conduct or other law, the 
lawyer shall consult with the client regarding the relevant limitations on the lawyer’s conduct.”). 
20. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 2. 
21. Rule 1.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct governs how attorneys 
handle fees.  TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.04.  Comment 2 to Rule 1.04 states 
that: “In a new client-lawyer relationship, an understanding as to the fee should be promptly 
established.  It is not necessary to recite all the factors that underlie the basis of the fee, but only those 
that are directly involved in its computation.”  Id. 
22. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 3. 
23. See Prudholm v. State, 274 S.W.3d 236, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008), aff’d, 
333 S.W.3d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (agreeing with opposing counsel “that the prosecutor’s 
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enable a lawyer to fully understand and appreciate the extent of the client’s 
situation and determine the best solution. 
Standard 4: Counsel will be faithful to their clients’ lawful objectives, while 
mindful of their concurrent duties to the legal system and the public good.24 
Commentary: As with all lawyers, appellate counsel should diligently 
fulfill his or her client’s objectives on appeal, but should not forget his or 
her other duties to the profession and the public at large.25 
Standard 5: Counsel will explain the appellate process to their clients.  
Counsel will advise clients of the range of potential outcomes, likely costs, 
 
statements about her personal feelings and beliefs” were out of bounds); Pritchett v. Highway Ins. 
Underwriters, 304 S.W.2d 585, 596 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1957), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
309 S.W.2d 46 (1958) (finding the attorney’s comment regarding their “personal feelings relative to 
women serving as jurors . . . and as to the inferences as to damage to his client’s character and business” 
were out of place and were not related to the issue at hand); accord Prudential Ballard Realty 
Co. v. Weatherly, 792 So. 2d 1045, 1067 (Ala. 2000) (per curiam) (“We will not let our emotions and 
personal feelings dictate the result in any case; our decisions are governed solely by the law and the 
facts.”); Cummings v. Borough of Nazareth, 242 A.2d 460, 468 (Pa. 1968) (“Of course, emotions must 
not be allowed to run rampant, nor will they, under our adversary court system where opposing 
attorneys are allowed maximum latitude to prove that the cause of the disabled person is not as 
presented by himself and counsel.”); Hatch v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 930 P.2d 382, 398 
(Wyo. 1997) (“A trial should be a rational exercise, not an emotional experience.  When counsel 
intentionally drive an otherwise routine case to the margins by infecting the trial with personal issues 
or by purposefully seeking to supercharge emotions, alert observers quickly recognize that the object 
is not justice, but victory. . . .”). 
24. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 4. 
25. For example, in Bond v. State, the appellate court noted that an attorney may not misrepresent 
the facts of a case or characterize a court as “‘despotic’ and ‘erratic and irrational’” as it is offensive 
and beyond the attorney’s duty to zealously advocate for his client.  Bond v. State, 176 S.W.3d 397, 
401–02 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).  Another example comes from San Antonio, 
where the appellate court impressed the limitations of fundamental First Amendment rights by noting, 
“an attorney’s right to free speech and her obligation to zealously represent her client are limited in the 
formal judicial setting where the State has a substantial interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial 
process and the public’s confidence therein.”  In re Maloney, 949 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio 1997, no writ) (per curiam) (first citing In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959); then citing 
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871); then citing In re Westfall, 808 S.W.2d 829, 835–36 
(Mo. 1991) (en banc); then citing Cerf v. State, 458 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1984) (per curiam); then 
citing In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Iowa 1976) (en banc); then citing In re Buckley, 110 Cal. 
Rptr. 121, 129 (1973) (en banc); then citing State v. Nelson, 504 P.2d 211, 214 (Kan. 1972) 
(per curiam); and then citing Mossop v. Zapp, 179 S.W. 685, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1915, 
no writ)). 
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timetables, effect of the judgment pending appeal, and the availability of 
alternative dispute resolution.26 
Commentary: Because appellate courts, and the appellate system at 
large, oftentimes do not receive the type of public attention that trial courts 
receive, it is imperative that appellate counsel explains the appellate process 
to his or her client, including the contemplative nature of an appellate 
decision, how such decisions are rendered and the anticipated timetable of 
the process.27 
Standard 6: Counsel will not foster clients’ unrealistic expectations.28 
Commentary: This standard can be quite difficult to follow in practice, 
but appellate counsel should temper rather than encourage a client’s 
unrealistic expectations in order to avoid further confusion, anger, or malice 
once an appeal has been decided.29 
Standard 7: Negative opinions of the court or opposing counsel shall not be 
expressed unless relevant to a client’s decision process.30 
Commentary: Appellate counsel should refrain from expressing any 
negative opinions or ad hominem criticism about a court or his or her 
 
26. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 5. 
27. See, e.g., Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25, 29 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (Baird, J., dissenting) 
(per curiam) (“[I]t is the professional duty of an appellate lawyer to explain the meaning and effect of an 
appellate court decision in his client’s case, to acquaint his client with available options for further 
review of the case, and to assist his client with the decision whether to seek such review.” (quoting Ex 
parte Jarret, 891 S.W.2d 935, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994), overruled by Ex parte Wilson, 956 S.W.2d 25 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (per curiam))). 
28. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 6. 
29. In the particular context of initial interview, investigation, and assessment of the case, Texas 
Practice Guide cautions attorneys to refrain from communicating to their client “[o]verly optimistic 
advice about the matter until it is fully evaluated, including researching current case law.”  1 ADELE 
HEDGES & KIM J. ASKEW, TEX. PRAC. GUIDE: CIVIL PRETRIAL § 1:169 (2017 ed.).  It adds that “a 
lawyer should not pander to the client’s unrealistic expectations.”  Id.  Similar advice is provided to 
attorneys in the Texas Practice Guide Torts, which states: “[C]ounsel should not be overly optimistic about 
the matter until it is fully evaluated, including researching current case law and should not pander to 
the client’s unrealistic expectations.”  3 KNOX D. NUNNALLY & RONALD G. FRANKLIN, TEX. PRAC. 
GUIDE TORTS § 11:293 (2017 ed.). 
30. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 7. 
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opposing counsel, unless such opinions will aid a client’s decisions in an 
appeal.31 
Standard 8: Counsel will keep clients informed and involved in decisions and 
will promptly respond to inquiries.32 
Commentary: Communication with a client is a key factor to competent, 
diligent, and ethical representation.33  This standard coincides with Texas 
Disciplinary Rule 1.03(a), which requires a lawyer to keep his or her client 
reasonably informed about a client’s case, as well as respond to reasonable 
requests by the client for information.34 
Standard 9: Counsel will advise their clients of proper behavior, including 
that civility and courtesy are expected.35 
Commentary: The standard places an obligation upon the appellate 
practitioner to ensure that his or her client understands appropriate behavior 
on appeal, as well as the value of civility and courtesy to other parties, the 
court, and its personnel.36 
 
31. See Bond v. State, 176 S.W.3d 397, 401–02 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.) 
(chastising an attorney for making disparaging remarks about the court, depicting it as “despotic,” 
“erratic[,] and irrational”); see also Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835, 840 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
1997, writ denied) (finding attorneys have latitude in making arguments in the appellate context, 
however, they may not go beyond “‘their rights and evidence a want of proper respect for the court’” 
(quoting Mossop v. Zapp, 179 S.W. 685, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.—Galveston 1915, no writ))). 
32. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 8. 
33. Ex Parte Guzmon, 730 S.W.2d 724, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (stressing the importance 
of communication and finding that the attorney was unable to put on a case due to his failure to discuss 
the issues with the client (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984))).  Courts have 
found that failure to communicate in a variety of contexts may result in ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  See Smith v. State, No. 04-12-00020-CR, 2012 WL 6743567, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 
Dec. 31, 2012, no pet.) (supporting the conclusion that an attorney’s failure to inform his client “of [a] 
plea offer’s deadline” constitutes deficient performance (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688–90)); see also 
Flores v. State, 784 S.W.2d 579, 581 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1990, pet. ref’d) (finding an attorney’s 
failure to communicate with opposing counsel regarding his client’s decision constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel).  
34. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.03(a), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2016) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9) (“A lawyer shall keep a client 
reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information.”).  
35. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 9. 
36. See, e.g., Gleason v. Isbell, 145 S.W.3d 354, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, 
no pet.) (per curiam) (“Incivility does not advance a litigant’s legal position, but only tends to eclipse 
or obscure whatever legal points he intended to make.  Incivility is not only ineffective but also ill-
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Standard 10: Counsel will advise their clients that counsel reserves the right 
to grant accommodations to opposing counsel in matters that do not 
adversely affect the client’s lawful objectives.  A client has no right to instruct 
a lawyer to refuse reasonable requests made by other counsel.37 
Commentary: This standard is a near verbatim recitation of Part II, 
Section 10 of the Texas Lawyer’s Creed, which places the right to grant 
accommodations and requests by opposing counsel which do not adversely 
affect a client’s objectives solely in hands of the lawyer and not the client.38 
Standard 11: A client has no right to demand that counsel abuse anyone or 
engage in any offensive conduct.39 
Commentary: This standard coincides with Part II, Section 6 of the 
Texas Lawyer’s Creed.40  This standard clearly establishes that a client has 
no right to instruct an appellate practitioner to engage in abusive or 
offensive conduct toward anyone or any entity. 
Standard 12: Counsel will advise clients that an appeal should only be pursued 
in a good faith belief that the trial court has committed error or that there is a 
reasonable basis for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, 
or that an appeal is otherwise warranted.41 
Commentary: This standard corresponds to Standard 1 of a Lawyer’s 
Duty to the Courts.42  The standard is of importance to appellate 
practitioners because it states that a lawyer shall advise his or her client that 
a sufficient basis should exist prior to pursuing an appeal.  However, the 
 
advised.  At a minimum, courts and those appearing before them expect and deserve civility and 
courtesy from all participants in the legal process.” (emphasis added) (first citing TEX. STANDARDS 
FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 9; and then citing id. Lawyers’ Duties to the 
Court Standard 8)).  
37. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 10. 
38. See TEXAS LAWYER’S CREED: A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM pt. II(10) (“I will 
advise my client that I reserve the right to determine whether to grant accommodations to opposing 
counsel in all matters that do not adversely affect my client’s lawful objectives.  A client has no right 
to instruct me to refuse reasonable requests made by other counsel.”). 
39. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 11. 
40. See TEXAS LAWYER’S CREED: A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM pt. II(6) (“I will treat 
adverse parties and witnesses with fairness and due consideration.  A client has no right to demand 
that I abuse anyone or indulge in any offensive conduct.”). 
41. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 12. 
42. Cf. id. Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 1 (using similar language).  
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standard is another that can be difficult to follow in practice, when a client’s 
true interest in pursuing an appeal is solely to delay proceedings and the 
client is willing to pay for the use of the appellate process to accomplish this 
goal. 
Standard 13: Counsel will advise clients that they will not take frivolous 
positions in an appellate court, explaining the penalties associated therewith.  
Appointed appellate counsel in criminal cases shall be deemed to have 
complied with this standard of conduct if they comply with the requirements 
imposed on appointed counsel by courts and statutes.43 
Commentary: This standard overlaps with Texas Disciplinary Rule 3.01, 
which states that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert 
or controvert an issue therein, unless the lawyer reasonably believes that 
there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.”44  Appellate counsel plays 
a vital role in ensuring that clients understand the viability of an appeal and 
whether such an appeal should be pursued.45  Furthermore, by following 
this standard, courts will operate more efficiently without having to address 
frivolous positions on appeal.46 
IV.    LAWYERS’ DUTIES TO THE COURT 
 As professionals and advocates, counsel assist the Court in the administration 
of justice at the appellate level.  Through briefs and oral submissions, counsel 
provide a fair and accurate understanding of the facts and law applicable to 
their case.  Counsel also serve the Court by respecting and maintaining the 
dignity and integrity of the appellate process. 
Standard 1: An appellate remedy should not be pursued unless counsel 
believes in good faith that error has been committed, that there is a reasonable 
 
43. Id. Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 13. 
44. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2016) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9). 
45. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (illustrating the importance 
of advising a client on the viability of their appeal by discussing an attorney’s right to withdraw from 
representation after determining the client’s appeal is wholly frivolous (quoting McCoy v. Court of 
Appeals of Wisconsin, Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429, 436 (1988))). 
46. Cf. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.02 (prohibiting a lawyer from taking 
a frivolous position that will increase the cost, burdens, and time expended to resolve a matter). 
  
2018] Annotated Guide and Commentary of Texas Standards of Appellate Conduct 235 
basis for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or that an 
appeal is otherwise warranted.47 
Commentary: Like its counterpart standard mentioned above 
(Standard 12), this standard specifically deals with a lawyer’s duty to the 
courts rather than the previous standard, which places a lawyer’s duty to his 
or her client to advise against pursuing a bad-faith appeal. 
Furthermore, while the Standards do not allow for sanctions, Texas Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 45 (“TRAP”) authorizes a court—upon a party’s 
motion or sua sponte—to assess appellate sanctions if the court determines 
that an appeal is frivolous.48  In several appellate cases where sanctions were 
imposed under this rule, parties attempted to re-litigate and appeal issues 
that were already decided.49  In the context of appointed counsel for 
criminals (as well as termination of parental rights cases), appellate counsel 
has the ability to file Anders briefs with the court, in which counsel concludes 
that based on his/her “good-faith review of the law and record . . . [there is] 
no plausible grounds for appeal.”50 
Standard 2: An appellate remedy should not be pursued primarily for 
purposes of delay or harassment.51 
Commentary: In Archer v. Wood,52 the Dallas Court of Appeals found 
that counsel who had requested oral argument, then failed to appear, and 
also provided the court with inadequate briefing, brought the appeal for 
purposes of delay and assessed sanctions under the TRAP.53  In contrast, a 
Fort Worth Court of Appeals denied a motion to sanction an appellant who 
brought an ERISA claim to recover benefits from a previous suit, despite 
res judicata, which the court found prevented the appellant from recovering 
such benefits.54  The court observed that “while the litigation in this suit 
was very contentious, we do not find that this appeal was brought solely to 
 
47. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 1. 
48. TEX. R. APP. P. 45. 
49. See, e.g., Njuku v. Middleton, 20 S.W.3d 176, 178 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied) 
(imposing sanctions against the appellants for bringing a frivolous appeal, and finding appellant 
repeatedly attempted to relitigate issues that were previously decided (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 45)). 
50. Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). 
51. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 2. 
52. Archer v. Wood, 771 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ). 
53. Id. at 633. 
54. Duran v. Resdoor Co., 977 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied). 
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harass the companies, or that it was completely groundless and filed for 
purposes of delay.”55 
Standard 3: Counsel should not misrepresent, mischaracterize, misquote, or 
miscite the factual record or legal authorities.56 
Commentary: The Fourteenth Court of Appeals sanctioned an attorney 
in a divorce case after the appellate lawyer cited to evidence outside the 
appellate record and failed to “recognize or even mention the debts assessed 
against each party’s share of the community estate in arguing that the trial 
court made a disproportionate division of community property in favor of 
[his ex-wife].”57 
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals imposed sanctions on an attorney who 
“mischaracterized the nature of the appeal as an interlocutory appeal,” 
which required the court to unnecessarily accelerate the appeal.58  The court 
found that the mischaracterization imposed a hardship on the court and its 
staff, as well as on other appeals pending before the court.59 
Standard 4: Counsel will advise the Court of controlling legal authorities, 
including those adverse to their position, and should not cite authority that 
has been reversed, overruled, or restricted without informing the court of 
those limitations.60 
Commentary: This standard relates to TRAP 38.1 (appellant’s brief)61 
and 38.2 (appellee’s brief),62 as well as the Texas Disciplinary Rule of 
Professional Conduct 3.03(a)(4).63  In a 1997 case from the Thirteenth 
Court of Appeals, the court ordered the relators of a mandamus proceeding 
to respond in writing to the court and show cause why the court should not 
impose sanctions for the relators’ failure to disclose a case directly adverse 
 
55. Id. 
56. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 3. 
57. Schlafy v. Schlafy, 33 S.W.3d 863, 873 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). 
58. Sossi v. Willette & Guerra, 139 S.W.3d 85, 90 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.) 
59. Id. (citing Schlafy, 33 S.W.3d at 873). 
60. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 4. 
61. TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1. 
62. Id. R. 38.2. 
63. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.03(a)(4), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2016) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9). 
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to their position as controlling authority, despite their filing of a thirty-seven 
page brief and three pages of authorities.64 
In contrast, another attorney fulfilled this standard by writing a letter brief 
to the court following oral argument, clarifying a case that she cited at 
argument.65  The attorney apologized to the court for misstating the law at 
argument and voluntarily corrected the error with a more thorough 
response.66 
Standard 5: Counsel will present the Court with a thoughtful, organized, and 
clearly written brief.67 
Commentary: Like Standard 4, this standard relates to the briefing rules 
of the TRAP.  Failure to comply with this standard, may result in a waiver 
of the issue on appeal.68  In practice, courts will typically provide parties 
with an opportunity to correct defective briefs before the briefs are 
considered “filed” by the court.69  Any failure to correct these errors may 
result in a dismissal in civil cases.70  Criminal appeals that fail to comply 
with these rules and standards follow separate procedures under the 
TRAP.71 
 
64. In re Colonial Pipeline Co., Texaco, Inc., 960 S.W.2d 272, 273–74 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1997) (orig. proceeding). 
65. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Dear Supreme Court: When a Lawyer Confesses Error, NAT’L L.J. (Oct. 4, 
2017, 5:53 PM), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/almID/1202799663925/?slreturn= 
20180305140514 [https://perma.cc/JXH7-V7BF] (describing the letter an attorney sent to the 
Supreme Court to correct an inaccuracy in her oral argument).  
66. Id. 
67. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 5, reprinted 
in TEX. R. APP. P. (West 2016). 
68. See Sunnyside Feedyard, L.C. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 106 S.W.3d 169, 173 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2003, no pet.) (“Failure to brief, or to adequately brief, an issue by an appellant effects a 
waiver of that issue on appeal.” (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(h); Gen. Servs. Comm’n v. Little-Tex 
Insulation Co., 39 S.W.3d 591, 598 n.1 (Tex. 2001), superseded by statute, TEX. GOV’T CODE 
ANN. §§ 2260.001–108 (West 2017), as recognized in Jackson v. Texas S. Univ., 997 F. Supp. 2d. 613 
(S.D. Tex. 2014); Fredonia State Bank v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 279, 284–85 (Tex. 1994))). 
69. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.9 (providing that if the court finds a defect in a brief, it may order 
the brief be amended, supplemented, or redrawn). 
70. See id. R. 38.8, 38.9 (authorizing a court to dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction if an 
appellant fails to timely amend their brief by deeming the noncompliant brief as if the party failed to 
file one). 
71. See id. R. 38.8(b) (governing an appellant’s brief in a criminal case). 
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Standard 6: Counsel will not submit reply briefs on issues previously briefed 
in order to obtain the last word.72 
Commentary: One common example in reply briefs before the court, 
which could be construed to violate this standard, is the raising of new issues 
or arguments.73  Like the other efforts to circumvent the briefing rules, 
raising new issues, arguments, or claims on appeal may result in a waiver of 
the argument.74 
Standard 7: Counsel will conduct themselves before the Court in a 
professional manner, respecting the decorum and integrity of the judicial 
process.75 
Commentary: Simply stated, do not be disrespectful to a court or its 
personnel. 
In 1996, the El Paso Court of Appeals referred an attorney to the State 
Bar of Texas for possible violations of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct.76  After the lawyer’s case had been submitted to the 
court by oral argument, counsel called a court staff member by telephone 
“for the purpose of inquiring, among other things, as to what his ‘chances’ 
were in the then pending case and whether he should ‘settle’ his case prior 
to the issuance of the opinion.”77  The court found, as a matter of law, that 
“any attempt to solicit or receive information on the merits of a pending 
case from a staff member of an appellate court constitutes an impermissible 
ex parte communication with chambers” because it undermines the integrity 
of the courts, breeds skepticism and distrust, and thwarts principles upon 
which the justice system is based.78  The El Paso Court did not make any 
findings of fact as to the alleged improprieties, but felt the mandatory need 
to refer the matter to the State Bar.79 
 
72. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 6. 
73. See U.S. Lawns, Inc. v. Castillo, 347 S.W.3d 844, 849 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2011, 
pet. denied) (finding the appellants were barred from “attacking the merits of the unchallenged ground 
in its reply brief”). 
74. See id. (reasoning a court of appeals may not reverse a trial court’s judgment based on a point 
of error not properly preserved and raised). 
75. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 7. 
76. In re J.B.K., 931 S.W.2d 581, 582 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ). 
77. Id. at 583. 
78. Id. at 584. 
79. Id. at 585. 
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In 1997, the San Antonio Court of Appeals sanctioned an attorney who 
made “disparaging remarks” in his reply brief by questioning the fitness of 
the trial judge.80  The Fourth Court of Appeals also noted that counsel made 
similar comments about the trial court during oral arguments.81  The court 
forwarded its opinion to the State Bar and asserted that the attorney’s 
actions put into questions his honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness to 
practice law.82 
In 1997, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals83 found an attorney in 
contempt of court for twice violating an injunction issued by the court.84  
As a sanction, a split court, sitting en banc, fined the lawyer $500 for each 
of the two convictions and ordered him confined to jail for thirty days.85  
Subsequently, the court set aside its order of confinement and ordered the 
lawyer to attend a one-day long ethics course sponsored by the Texas Center 
for Legal Ethics and Professionalism, and insisted that the lawyer pay a fine 
of $1,000.86 
Standard 8: Counsel will be civil and respectful in all communications with 
the judges and staff.87 
Commentary: In In re Wightman,88 the Dallas Court of Appeals denied 
habeas relief to a lawyer who was held in contempt for sending a letter to a 
trial court judge expressing his opinion that the judge was incompetent and 
corrupt.89  The letter also threatened to file disciplinary charges and sue the 
judge if the judge failed to rule in the lawyer’s favor.90  The lawyer was 
sentenced to ninety days in jail; by denying habeas relief, the appellate court 
affirmed the decision.91 
 
80. Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835, 840–41 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied). 
81. Id. at 840. 
82. Id. at 841. 
83. In re Cantu, 961 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (en banc). 
84. Id. at 489. 
85. Id. at 490. 
86. Id. at 494–95. 
87. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 8, reprinted 
in TEX. R. APP. P. (West 2016). 
88. In re Wightman, No. 05-98-01697-CV, 1998 WL 877494 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 17, 1998, 
no pet.) (not designated for publication). 
89. Id. at *1. 
90. Id. at *3. 
91. Id. at *1. 
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Anecdotally, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals received a letter from an 
attorney challenging the clerk’s “analysis of the law” which resulted in the 
attorney being charged a $145 filing fee for a habeas petition filed on behalf 
of his client.  The letter included the following threat: “I shall shortly file a 
suit against you” for recovery of the fee.  The lawyer added, however, that 
he harbored “no ill will” against the clerk. 
One of the best explanations and commentaries on civility and respect in 
the courts and judicial system is found in Gleason v. Isbell.92  In that case, a 
pro se appellant filed a motion for rehearing which lodged several 
accusations against the panel’s original opinion, including calling it 
“disingenuous,” “dishonest,” “retaliatory,” “false,” “corrupt,” and 
“fraudulent.”93  Writing separately from the majority on the issue of 
whether to grant appellant’s motion to withdraw his motion for rehearing 
and grant a motion for extension of time to file a new motion for rehearing, 
then-Justice, now Chief Justice Kem Thompson Frost noted that: 
Judges are the guardians of the court as an institution and so they must insist 
that all who come before the court act with dignity, decorum, and respect.  
Even though judges, on a personal level, might be willing to suffer insults and 
personal attacks like those contained in appellant’s filings, they must, by virtue 
of their office, protect the dignity of the court from such offensive and 
unacceptable conduct.  As individuals, the justices of this court may not have 
garnered appellant’s respect or esteem, but, we must, as judges, demand 
respect for this court as an institution. 
[ . . . . ] 
As guardians of the public’s confidence in our legal system, judges must 
maintain a strong commitment to both inspire and demand the highest 
standards of civility and personal behavior from litigants and lawyers 
appearing in the courts of this state.94 
 
92. Gleason v. Isbell, 145 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) 
(per curiam). 
93. Id. at 356 (Frost, J., concurring and dissenting). 
94. Id. at 358.  
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Standard 9: Counsel will be prepared and punctual for all Court appearances, 
and will be prepared to assist the Court in understanding the record, 
controlling authority, and the effect of the court’s decision.95 
Commentary: In the spirit of this standard, TRAP 45 permits an 
appellate court to award the prevailing party just damages upon a 
determination that a civil appeal is frivolous.96 
The [C]ourts of [A]ppeals have recited four factors which tend to indicate that 
an appeal is frivolous: (1) the unexplained absence of a statement of facts; 
(2) the unexplained failure to file a motion for new trial when it is required to 
successfully assert factual sufficiency on appeal; (3) a poorly written brief 
raising no arguable points of error; and (4) the appellant’s unexplained failure 
to appear at oral argument.97 
In Stafford v. Stafford,98 the Amarillo Court of Appeals sanctioned an 
appellant’s counsel under TRAP 45 where the court found that 
counsel: (1) failed to mention that an earlier opinion of the court resolved 
the issue he raised; (2) filed an incomplete record; (3) filed an inadequate 
brief; and (4) failed to respond to the appellee’s motion for sanctions.99 
As a practical tip, if appellate counsel is asked a question during oral 
argument about the trial record that they are unable to answer, he or she 
should offer to file a post-argument “letter brief” providing the requested 
information. 
Standard 10: Counsel will not permit a client’s or their own ill feelings toward 
the opposing party, opposing counsel, trial judges or members of the appellate 
 
95. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 9, reprinted 
in TEX. R. APP. P. (West 2016). 
96. TEX. R. APP. P. 45; see also Am. Paging of Texas, Inc. v. El Paso Paging, Inc., 9 S.W.3d 237, 
240, 242 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. denied) (finding the appeal groundless and pursued in bad 
faith, and, therefore, imposing a penalty of 50% of actual damages where appellant failed to file a 
reporter’s record and failed to disclose material facts in its brief). 
97. Am. Paging of Texas, Inc., 9 S.W.3d at 241 (citing In re S.R.M., 888 S.W.2d 267, 269 
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); Baw v. Baw, 949 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
1997, no writ); James v. Hudgins, 876 S.W.2d 418, 424 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1994, writ denied)). 
98. Stafford v. Stafford, No. 07-04-0262-CV, 2004 WL 2029704 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 
Sept. 10, 2004, pet. dism’d). 
99. Id. at *3. 
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court to influence their conduct or demeanor in dealings with the judges, staff, 
other counsel, and parties.100 
Commentary: Counsel should exercise good judgment in his or her 
behavior with other parties or court staff.  In In Re Terminix International, 
Co.,101 the Thirteenth Court of Appeals ordered sanctions be paid by a 
lawyer to his opposing counsel for refusing to fax a copy of the relator’s 
mandamus petition.102  Terminix, the relator, filed a mandamus petition 
delivered to the court by Federal Express on February 6, 2004, and sent the 
real parties a copy of the petition by certified mail.103  The court requested 
an expedited response from real parties by February 11, 2004.104  When 
counsel for real parties received the request for a response—but still had 
not received a copy of the petition—counsel for real parties asked relator’s 
counsel to fax a copy of the petition.105  Relator’s counsel refused, 
explaining that “it was almost 5:00 p.m. on Friday, and no one was available 
in [his] office to send the fax at that time.”106  By refusing to provide a 
faxed copy, relator’s counsel reduced the real parties’ “response time from 
five days to two.”107  In imposing sanctions, the court found that relator’s 
counsel’s refusal “was unreasonable and designed to thwart opposing 
counsel’s ability to timely and effectively respond to the petition.”108 
V.    LAWYERS’ DUTIES TO LAWYERS 
Lawyers bear a responsibility to conduct themselves with dignity towards and 
respect for each other, for the sake of maintaining the effectiveness and 
credibility of the system they serve.  The duty that lawyers owe their clients 
and the system can be most effectively carried out when lawyers treat each 
other honorably. 
 
100. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to the Court Standard 9. 
101. In re Terminix Int’l, Co., 131 S.W.3d 651 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, no pet.).  
102. Id. at 653–54. 
103. Id. at 652–53.  
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 653. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 654. 
  
2018] Annotated Guide and Commentary of Texas Standards of Appellate Conduct 243 
Standard 1: Counsel will treat each other and all parties with respect.109 
Commentary: When it comes to lawyer-to-lawyer relationships, this is 
the Golden Rule.110  Counsel should always treat all opposing counsel and 
parties the way that they would expect to be treated. 
Standard 2: Counsel will not unreasonably withhold consent to a reasonable 
request for cooperation or scheduling accommodation by opposing 
counsel.111 
Commentary: This standard relates closely to Standard 10 of the 
Lawyer’s Duties to their Clients.112  Appellate counsel should not withhold 
consent to reasonable requests for filings or scheduling accommodations 
made by opposing counsel.113 
Standard 3: Counsel will not request an extension of time solely for the 
purpose of unjustified delay.114 
Commentary: Sometimes appellate counsel must seek reasonable 
requests for extension of time to file briefs or other matters before an 
appellate court.  Those requests, however, should be reasonable and not 
brought solely for purposes of delaying justice for any party.115 
Standard 4: Counsel will be punctual in communications with opposing 
counsel.116 
 
109. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 1, reprinted 
in TEX. R. APP. P. (West 2016). 
110. See TEXAS LAWYER’S CREED: A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM ¶ 4 (“The desire for 
respect and confidence by lawyers from the public should provide the members of our profession with 
the necessary incentive to attain the highest degree of ethical and professional conduct.”). 
111. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 2. 
112. See id. Lawyers’ Duties to Clients Standard 10 (instructing counsel to advise their clients 
that they may make reasonable accommodations for opposing counsel). 
113. Dubose, supra note 1, at 197 (“Young lawyers or lawyers who rarely practice in the 
appellate courts may not realize that appellate judges and justices frown on counsel’s opposing 
reasonable requests for scheduling accommodations . . . .”). 
114. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 3. 
115. See, e.g., Medrano v. Zapata, No. 03-12-00131-CV, 2013 WL 610822, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Austin Feb. 12, 2013, no pet.) (per curiam) (allowing counsel an additional extension (even though this 
was the sixth motion for extension of time filed) where counsel provided what the court believed was 
a “reasonable explanation[],” but warning that “no further extensions of time will be granted”). 
116. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 4. 
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Commentary: Just like Standard 9’s Duties to the Courts, counsel should 
be punctual with his or her communications to opposing counsel.117  In 
many circumstances, opposing counsel acts on a tight deadline in which a 
response from opposing counsel is necessary and required by the court.  
Appellate counsel should be mindful of these time constraints and respond 
promptly to an opposing counsel’s communication. 
Standard 5: Counsel will not make personal attacks on opposing counsel or 
parties.118 
Commentary: No matter how contentious or bitter a particular case may 
be, counsel should refrain from personally attacking any lawyer or party in 
order to foster continued dignity and civility in the practice of law.119 
Standard 6: Counsel will not attribute bad motives or improper conduct to 
other counsel without good cause, or make unfounded accusations of 
impropriety.120 
 
117. See In re Terminix Int’l, Co., 131 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2004, 
no pet.) (fining counsel for unreasonably refusing to “fax a copy of the petition for writ of mandamus 
to opposing counsel”); see also Dubose, supra note 1, at 197–98 (discussing the useful nature of the 
Standards in instructing attorneys regarding a court’s expectations for their conduct in appellate 
proceedings). 
118. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 5. 
119. See Arrington v. State, No. 08-00-00389-CR, 2002 WL 1763995, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso 
July 31, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (“While a prosecutor is permitted to attack the 
argument of defense counsel, he clearly cannot attack counsel’s personal integrity.” (citing 
Mosley v. State, 983 S.W.2d 249, 258–59 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998))); Garcia v. State, 943 S.W.2d 215, 
217 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no pet.) (“The courts of this state have repeatedly admonished 
lawyers who engage in personal attacks on opposing counsel.  When the admonishments are ignored, 
the courts, including this court and our sister court in Dallas, have imposed stronger sanctions.” (citing 
Byas v. State, 906 S.W.2d 86, 87 (Tex. App.––Fort Worth 1995, pet. ref’d) (per curiam); Kelly v. State, 
903 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Tex. App.––Dallas 1995, pet. ref’d))); see also MYRON MOSKOVITZ, WINNING 
AN APPEAL 98–99 (rev. ed. 1985) (“This attitude will cause you to misdirect your attention and your 
energy.  You are at oral argument to convince the judges, not your opponent.”).  In Byas v. State, the 
Fort Worth Court of Appeals found that the prosecutor’s comments that “defense counsel is a ‘slick 
attorney’ was not only irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of Appellant, but it implied that the 
prosecutor’s credibility exceeded that of defense counsel[.]” 906 S.W.2d at 87.  The court found that 
the prosecutor’s remarks were inappropriate “personal attacks.”  Id.  But see Weeks v. State, 396 S.W.3d 
737, 746 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2013, pet. ref’d) (finding the prosecutor’s response to opposing 
counsel was not a personal attack but an answer, thus it was not improper (citing Mosley, 983 S.W.2d 
at 258–59; Davis v. State, 268 S.W.3d 683, 713 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref’d))). 
120. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 6. 
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Commentary: Unfortunately, opposing counsel may act or behave in an 
inappropriate manner, or in violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of 
Professional Conduct.  Counsel should be cautious, however, in making 
such accusations unless they are supported by good cause.121 
Standard 7: Counsel will not lightly seek court sanctions.122 
Commentary: Counsel should act with caution before seeking appellate 
sanctions against a party or an attorney.  TRAP 45 governs sanctions in civil 
appeals,123 and TRAP 52.11 governs sanctions that may be imposed in 
original proceedings.124  
Standard 8: Counsel will adhere to oral or written promises and agreements 
with other counsel.125 
Commentary: In order to facilitate the administration of justice and the 
appellate process, counsel who promise or reach agreements must adhere to 
such agreements to avoid further litigation, cost, and expenses of an 
appeal.126  It is as simple––and important––as keeping one’s word. 
Standard 9: Counsel will neither ascribe to another counsel or party a position 
that counsel or the party has not taken, nor seek to create an unjustified 
inference based on counsel’s statements or conduct.127 
Commentary: The best appellate advocates rely on their own arguments 
and distinguish opposing counsel’s arguments.128  While it is acceptable to 
 
121. See, e.g., Gilbert v. State, 494 S.W.3d 758, 770 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, 
pet. ref’d) (overruling the appellant’s issues, including a claim that opposing counsel had personally 
attacked them, and finding the prosecutor’s argument was permissible (citing Weeks, 396 S.W.3d 
at 746)). 
122. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 7. 
123. TEX. R. APP. P. 45 (outlining damages for frivolous appeals in civil cases). 
124. Id. R. 52.11 (discussing groundless petitions and misleading statements). 
125. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 8. 
126. Cf. Padilla v. LaFrance, 907 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. 1995) (“As previously discussed, the 
summary judgment evidence established an enforceable settlement agreement as a matter of law.”). 
127. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 9. 
128. Lawrence D. Rosenberg, Oral Argument, in A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO APPELLATE 
ADVOCACY 284–85 (Anne Marie Lofaso ed., 2010) (instructing appellate attorneys on how to pare 
down the issues in their argument and examine the weaknesses of it). 
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draw reasonable inferences from a position taken by opposing counsel, such 
inferences should not be unjustified or unreasonable.129 
Standard 10: Counsel will not attempt to obtain an improper advantage by 
manipulation of margins and type size in a manner to avoid court rules 
regarding page limits.130 
Commentary: TRAP 9.4 sets forth various guidelines regarding briefs, 
including: paper type and size, margins, spacing, typeface, and length of 
briefs.131  Typically, briefs that are non-compliant are rejected by a court’s 
clerk.132  However, counsel should never attempt to manipulate the briefing 
rules to gain a strategic advantage, whatever it may be.133 
Standard 11: Counsel will not serve briefs or other communications in a 
manner or at a time that unfairly limits another party’s opportunity to 
respond.134 
Commentary: Parties should not attempt to “one up” the opposing side 
by serving briefs or other filings in an unfair manner.  The best cases are 
those that have given both sides the ability to fully brief their positions and 
opposing counsel an opportunity to reasonably respond.135 
 
129. Id. at 279–80 (emphasizing the importance of anticipating your opponent’s arguments to 
craft your own argument to counter theirs). 
130. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 10. 
131. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4 (detailing the requirements for all documents filed with a Texas 
appellate court). 
132. Id. R. 9.4(k) (“If a document fails to conform with these rules, the court may strike the 
document or identify the error and permit the party to resubmit the document in a confirming format 
by a specified deadline.”); In re V.P., No. 02-14-00141-CV, 2015 WL 221891, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort 
Worth Jan. 15, 2015, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem.) (“We stated in our letter to Appellant that her failure 
to timely file an amended brief in compliance with the above rules could result in the waiver of 
noncompliant points, our striking her brief, or the dismissal of her appeal.” (citing TEX. R. APP. 
P. 38.8(a), 38.9(a), 42.3(b), (c))); see also Mendoza v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., No. 02-12-00324-CV, 2013 WL 
260923, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 24, 2013, no pet. h.) (per curiam) (striking appellant’s 
noncompliant brief and dismissing the appeal (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 38.8(a)(1), 38.9(a), 42.3(c), 43.2(f); 
Newman v. Clark, 113 S.W.3d 622, 623 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.) (per curiam))). 
133. The Authors note that this particular standard should be amended to reflect changes to 
the briefing rules with regard to electronically filed documents.  See generally TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(j) 
(providing the guidelines for electronically filed documents). 
134. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Lawyers’ Duties to Lawyers Standard 11. 
135. E.g., Dennis Owens & Anne Marie Lofase, Professionalism and Ethics in Appellate Procedure, in 
A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 22–23 (Anne Marie Lofaso ed., 2010) 
(echoing the emphasis should be on the merits of the case and not the extrinsic elements).  
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VI.    THE COURT’S RELATIONSHIP WITH COUNSEL 
Unprofessionalism can exist only to the extent it is tolerated by the court.  
Because courts grant the right to practice law, they control the manner in 
which the practice is conducted.  The right to practice requires counsel to 
conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the role of the appellate 
courts in administering justice.  Likewise, no one more surely sets the tone 
and the pattern for the conduct of appellate lawyers than appellate judges.  
Judges must practice civility in order to foster professionalism in those 
appearing before them. 
Standard 1: Inappropriate conduct will not be rewarded, while exemplary 
conduct will be appreciated.136 
Commentary: It is rare to find written expressions of appreciation from 
appellate courts.  Still, there are a few.  In Stovall v. State,137 the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals wrote: 
The Court appreciates this well[-]prepared record from the office of the 
District Clerk of Tarrant County, and especially the deputy clerk who typed 
and included docket sheet entries instead of using a photographic copy of the 
handwriting of the trial judge, which is usually sent up in most records.  Some 
copies of handwritten docket entries are almost impossible to read and some 
are illegible.138 
Furthermore, under this standard, appellate courts might recognize an 
attorney’s departure from the Standards as a means to discourage such 
behavior.  For instance, in the case of In re Goldblatt,139 the Fort Worth 
Court of Appeals admonished counsel for making misrepresentations to the 
court: 
[T]his court will not tolerate any further misrepresentations by counsel for 
Goldblatt.  At oral argument, counsel for Goldblatt informed this court that 
he had advised his client not to seek eviction until after the enforceability of 
the permanent injunction had been determined, but he also indicated in the 
petition for writ of mandamus and prohibition that “[e]ach of [Goldblatt’s] 
listed actions have been taken on the advice of counsel.”  We remind counsel 
 
136. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, Court’s Relationship with Counsel Standard 1. 
137. Stovall v. State, 480 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972). 
138. Id. at 224 n.1. 
139. In re Goldblatt, 38 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.). 
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of his ethical obligations under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional 
Conduct and his obligations as an appellate practitioner under the Standards 
for Appellate Conduct adopted by this court.140 
The Goldblatt case illustrates a clear instance of a court referencing the 
Standards and “not rewarding” such inappropriate conduct. 
Standard 2: The court will take special care not to reward departures from 
the record.141 
Commentary: This standard has been adopted into the rules of appellate 
procedure and the common law applying them.142  TRAP 34.1 provides 
that the “appellate record consists of the clerk’s record and, if necessary to 
the appeal, the reporter’s record.”143  Appellate courts cannot consider 
documents that are not included in the appellate record.144 
This scenario is seen most often when items are included in the appendix 
to a brief that were not otherwise included in the appellate record.145  Such 
items are not considered by the appellate court.146  And oftentimes the 
 
140. Id. at 805 n.2 (alterations in original) (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT 
R. 3.01, 3.03, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2016) (Tex. State Bar 
R. art. X, § 9)).  
141. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, The Court’s Relationship with Counsel 
Standard 2. 
142. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the 
contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.” (emphasis added)); 
Adams v. Reynolds Tile & Flooring, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 417, 423 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, 
no pet.) (interpreting Rule 38.1(f) as requiring appellate briefs to support their statement of facts by 
references to the record (citing Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288, 293 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.))); see also Burke v. Ins. Auto Auctions Corp., 169 S.W.3d 771, 775 
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (“[A]n appellate court cannot consider documents or hearings 
that are cited in the brief and not attached as appendices if they are not formally included in the record 
on appeal.” (citing Green v. Kaposta, 152 S.W.3d 839, 841 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.))). 
143. TEX. R. APP. P. 34.1.   
144. See Burke, 169 S.W.3d at 775 (“We cannot consider those documents that are not properly 
included in the appellate record or before this Court.”(citing Green, 152 S.W.3d at 841)); Green, 
152 S.W.3d at 841 (“We have little latitude on appeal and cannot remedy deficiencies in a litigant’s brief 
or supply an adequate record.” (citing Strange v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 126 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2004, no pet.))). 
145. See, e.g., Adams, 120 S.W.3d at 423 (failing to consider parts of an employee handbook that 
had been attached as appendices to the appellate brief, because those parts were not part of the 
appellate record (citing Nguyen, 93 S.W.3d at 293)). 
146. See Nguyen, 93 S.W.3d at 293 (“The attachment of documents as exhibits or appendices to 
briefs is not formal inclusion in the record on appeal and, therefore, the documents cannot be 
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court will say explicitly in its opinion that it is not considering those 
documents due to counsel’s failure to follow the appropriate rules.147  
Therefore, as a practical tip: if a practitioner discovers that something was 
omitted from the appellate record when writing his or her brief, it would be 
wise to ensure that either a supplemental clerk’s record or supplemental 
reporter’s record is filed with the court. 
Standard 3: The court will be courteous, respectful, and civil to counsel.148 
Commentary: Many appellate judges throughout the State of Texas 
enjoy cordial relationships with attorneys throughout the state, and, in 
particular, with members of the Appellate Section of the State Bar of 
Texas.149  Nevertheless, judges should be mindful of this standard when 
dealing with counsel.  Judges are likewise reminded that Canon 1 of the 
Texas Code of Judicial Conduct encourages judges to establish, maintain, 
and enforce high standards of conduct.150 
Standard 4: The court will not disparage the professionalism or integrity of 
counsel based upon the conduct or reputation of counsel’s client or co-
counsel.151 
 
considered.” (citing Perry v. Kroger Stores, Store No. 119, 741 S.W.2d 533, 534 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
1987, no writ))). 
147. Cf. Green, 152 S.W.3d at 841 (finding the pro se appellants preserved nothing for the court’s 
review; insisting pro se litigants are “held to the same standards as licensed attorneys and must comply 
with applicable laws and rules of procedure” (citing Strange, 126 S.W.3d at 677–78)). 
148. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, The Court’s Relationship with Counsel 
Standard 3, reprinted in TEX. R. APP. P. (West 2016). 
149. Cf. Kevin Dubose, Standards of Appellate Conduct: Insight into Their Creation and Purpose, 
62 TEX. B.J. 558, 559 (1999) (describing Texas appellate culture as “comparatively immune to the 
problem (overly aggressive and unprofessional conduct [seen at the trial level])” and, therefore, 
“somewhat above the professionalism fray”); see also Lynne Liberato, Sections: The Pride of the Bar, 
63 TEX. B.J. 240, 240 (2000) (indicating that the Appellate Section of the State Bar of Texas worked 
keenly with the Texas Supreme Court to obtain approval of the Standards). 
150. TEX. CODE JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 1, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, 
subtit. G, app. B (West 2013).  
151. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, The Court’s Relationship with Counsel 
Standard 4. 
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Commentary: Under this standard, judges should not call into question 
an appellate counsel’s professionalism or integrity based upon who that 
lawyer represents or who that lawyer associates with on a case.152 
Standard 5: The court will endeavor to avoid the injustice that can result from 
delay after submission of a case.153 
Commentary: All appellate courts provide reports to the Office of Court 
Administration regarding the number of cases disposed of and the average 
length of time to disposition.154  Generally, intermediate appellate courts 
strive to dispose of cases within a year of submission.155  In certain cases, 
the legislature obligates appellate courts to dispose of cases at a faster 
pace.156  Appeals from an order terminating parental rights should as far as 
 
152. But see Sheshtawy v. Sheshtawy, 150 S.W.3d 772, 778–79 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, 
pet. denied) (finding a judge need not recuse himself from presiding over a divorce proceeding despite 
the fact that the judge had a personal relationship with the wife’s attorney and that the judge had made 
disparaging comments to the husband without more, because it did not demonstrate the judge was 
impartial or biased); Garcia v. State, No. 03-97-00641-CR, 1998 WL 798593, at *2 (Tex. App.—Austin 
Nov. 19, 1998, pet. ref’d) (concluding, after the judge was accused of “tak[ing] it upon himself to 
publicly humiliate a lawyer in the context of a judicial proceeding,” that “[w]hatever this Court may 
think of the district court’s handling of appellant’s trial, and in particular of the court’s statements to 
and about defense counsel, we cannot say that the court committed reversible error”); Dallas Consol. 
Elec. St. Ry. Co. v. Rutherford, 78 S.W. 558, 560 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, no writ) (“Several assignments 
of error are presented complaining of remarks made by the trial judge tending to humiliate defendant’s 
counsel and prejudice or disparage him before the jury.”).   
153. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, The Court’s Relationship with Counsel 
Standard 5. 
154. Statistics & Other Data, TEX. JUD. BRANCH, http://www.txcourts.gov/statistics/annual-
statistical-reports/ [https://perma.cc/GS7E-KQDU]; see also Carl Reynolds, Texas Courts 2030—
Strategic Trends & Responses, 51 S. TEX. L. REV. 951, 960 n.30 (2010) (“[N]ot all clerks report every year, 
but reporting [to the Office of Court Administration] is mandatory.”); Kent Rutter, Texas Supreme Court, 
72 TEX. B.J. 32, 32, 32 n.1 (2009) (commenting on Texas Supreme Court case disposition statistics and 
crediting the Office of Court Administration as the basis for said statistics); Randy Wilson, Civil 
Litigation Trends in One of the Nation’s Largest Counties, HOUS. LAW., July–Aug. 2013, at 10, 14 (crediting 
the Texas Office of Court Administration for data concerning litigation trends). 
155. See TEX. OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS 
JUDICIARY: COURT LEVEL 11 (2016) (indicating at least 100% clearance rate within the 2016 year for 
all Texas courts of appeals). 
156. Ann Crawford McClure et al., A Guide to Proceedings Under the Texas Parental Notification 
Statute and Rules, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 755, 818 (2000) (“[T]he Legislature has mandated that the Texas 
Supreme Court issue rules that ensure expeditious rulings in Chapter 33 proceedings.  Although an 
application is deemed granted if the trial court fails to timely rule, the Legislature’s clear intent is that 
courts timely rule—either grant or deny—and that the Texas Supreme Court draft rules that will ensure 
that outcome.” (footnote omitted)). 
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reasonably possible be disposed of “[w]ithin 180 days of the date the notice 
of appeal is filed.”157 
Standard 6: The court will abide by the same standards of professionalism 
that it expects of counsel in its treatment of the facts, the law, and the 
arguments.158 
Commentary: Judges are not excused from following the Standards.  
Further, not only should judges ensure that the Standards are followed, but 
judges should likewise lead by example. 
Standard 7: Members of the court will demonstrate respect for other judges 
and courts.159 
Commentary: Oftentimes judges will disagree with fellow judges or 
sister courts in a decision or opinion.160  Judges must always maintain 
professionalism, respect, and civility for one another, even if disagreement 
arises, regardless of the magnitude of the decision being rendered.  The Bar 
(and public) are always watching, and the Bench should always strive to 
serve as the leading example of high ethical standards. 
VII.    CONCLUSION 
This Article has hopefully provided the reader with a deeper insight into 
each standard.  The Standards serve as a guiding light not only for 
practitioners, but also for the courts and their personnel.  The Authors 
believe that when we all strive toward the Standards, the practice of law, our 
profession, and the administration of justice all benefit. 
 
 
157. TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2(a), reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. F app. 
(West 2013). 
158. TEX. STANDARDS FOR APP. CONDUCT, The Court’s Relationship with Counsel 
Standard 6. 
159. Id. Standard 7. 
160. Cf. Catherine M. Stone et al., Civility in the Legal Profession: A Survey of the Texas Judiciary, 
36 ST. MARY’S L.J. 115, 120 (2004) (“Judges have lost the ability to disagree without being 
disagreeable.”). 
